Capital Punishment and Specific Offense Deterrence by Giardina, Brian
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Master's Theses and Capstones Student Scholarship
Winter 2010
Capital Punishment and Specific Offense
Deterrence
Brian Giardina
University of New Hampshire, Durham
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Capstones by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For
more information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Giardina, Brian, "Capital Punishment and Specific Offense Deterrence" (2010). Master's Theses and Capstones. 138.
https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/138
Capital Punishment and Specific Offense Deterrence
BY
Brian Giardina
BA, University of New Hampshire, 2009
Thesis
Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
In partial fulfillment of







INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,




Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
uestfPro
ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
This thesis has been examined and approved.
essor of Political SciencectóffSusan Siggelakis,
Associate Professor of Justice StudiesCharles Putn
/








I. A RECENT HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 3
II. EXISTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 8
III. EXPLANATION OF CURRENT STUDY 17
A. DATAAND MEASURES 17
B. METHOD 19
IV. RESULTS 22
A. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 22
B. FIRSTHYPOTHESIS 22
C. SECONDHYPOTHESIS 23
V. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER
RESEARCH 25






1 . Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2000 34
2. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2001 35
3. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2002 36
4. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2003 37
5. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2004 38
6. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2005 39
7. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2006 40
8. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2007 41
9. Regression Coefficients for Multiple Regression analyses for law enforcement
Officer Deaths in 2008 42
10. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (M) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2000 43
1 1 . Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (M) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 200 1 44
12. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (M) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2002 45
13. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (M) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2003 46
IV
14. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (t-1) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2004 47
15. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (t-1) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2005 48
16. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (t-1) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2006 49
17. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (t-1) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2007 50
18. Regression Coefficients for total executions in year (t-1) and law enforcement
officer deaths in 2008 51
?
ABSTRACT
Capital Punishment and Specific Offense Deterrence
by
Brian Giardina
University ofNew Hampshire, December, 2010
Deterrence has historically been a justification for capital punishment. Recent
studies have found deterrent effects as strong as eighteen murders prevented per
execution (Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd, 2003). Most prior studies have tested for
deterrent effects on homicide rates generally. The current study looks for a deterrent
effect on a specific type of capital crime; the felonious killing of law enforcement
officers. Two separate hypotheses were tested. First, the presence of a capital
punishment statute will deter this specific type of homicide in a given year. Second,
executions for any reason will reduce the likelihood of this specific type of homicide in
the subsequent year. Results indicate no causal connection between rates of law
enforcement officers being killed and the presence of a capital punishment statute.




In 2009 the New Hampshire General Court passed House Bill 520 creating a
commission to review the implementation, legality, and future of capital punishment.
The bill charges a 22-member commission with the task of determining whether capital
punishment serves the interests of the State of New Hampshire as well as victims and
citizens. Differing expert opinions and justifications have been brought before the
commission to explain the use of capital punishment. This commission, like similar
bodies in other states, is faced with a difficult task. Gaps in the literature and differing
moral perspectives frequently complicate the debate over capital punishment.
Previous capital punishment research has been focused on deterrence theory. The
central tenets of deterrence theory were outlined by Cesare Beccaria in OfCrimes and
Punishments (1 764). According to Beccaria a punishment must meet four requirements
in order to serve as a deterrent: celerity or quickness, certainty of punishment, severity or
proportionality and exposure to general public. Deterrence theory lost favor among
criminologists in the earlier part of the 20* century, but it was revived by those who
sought to apply economic principles to crime (Becker, 1968). Raising the costs
associated with committing crime lowers the expected gain and, according to the theory,
makes committing crime less profitable or advantageous. Isaac Ehrlich applied economic
principles to this issue in a groundbreaking study (1975). He found that for every
execution, eight innocent lives are saved (Ehrlich, 1975). The methodology used in that
study has been criticized by criminologists and recalculated in the following 25 years,
(Walker, 2001 ; Bowers and Pierce, 1975). The data was found to be inaccurate, sensitive
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to tweaking by removing certain years and generally inconclusive (Bowers and Pierce,
1975). This has not stopped the reapplication of econometric principals of analysis to
capital punishment and deterrence.
Currently deterrence theory exists in two forms, both general and specific.
General deterrence is when punishments are aimed at deterring the entire public,
including those who did not commit a crime. This particular type of deterrent effect is
measured by testing crime rates and, in the case of the death penalty, homicide rates.
Research on capital punishment and general deterrence is divided. Some studies show
that homicides can be prevented by using capital punishment (Shepherd, 2005; Rubin
2002). Other studies have used similar methods and data and found no significant
deterrent effect (Kovandzic, Vieraitis and Boots, 2009). Specific deterrence is when a
deterrent effect is measured only for the individual who committed the crime. This can
be measured by reoffending and recidivism rates. Due to the "final" nature of capital
punishment, specific deterrence is not researched in capital punishment literature.
However, both types of deterrence theory can be combined to look for a deterrent effect
on capital crimes. This has been done in the past, (Peterson & Bailey, 1994 and Fagan,
Zimring and Geller, 2006), but no deterrent effect was found.
The deterrence question has sometimes been framed as, "Does capital punishment
deter as well or better than life without parole?" (Bedau, 2004) This question, one of
marginal deterrence, has been the subject of prior research (Fagan et al., 2006). However,
the question asked here is different, i.e., does the presence, or use, of capital punishment
grant law enforcement officers extra protection they would otherwise not have? The
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extra protection would be the deterrent effect, reducing the number of felonious law
enforcement deaths and making it safer to be a police officer.
CHAPTER I
RECENT HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES
Capital punishment had been practiced in Europe and most cultures around the
globe for centuries before exploration of the new world. Early European settlers brought
capital punishment customs with them to this continent. The first execution by the
settlers took place in 1608 when a Virginia man was put to death for being a Spanish spy
(Encyclopedia of Criminology, 2005). All of the original colonies had capital punishment
statutes, some which outlined as many as 12 death-eligible crimes. Executions were
public affairs, meant to deter and dissuade potential offenders. In this time executions
were mandatory if a person was found guilty of a death-eligible crime. Men, women and
young adult offenders were subject equally to these harsh laws. Capital punishment has
existed for most of human history and is experiencing an increase in types of reform
during the past half century. Judicial and legislative actions are at the forefront of
controlling capital punishment.
Reform, over time, has changed capital punishment from public hanging to its
procedurally dominated current incarnation. States moved executions out of the public
eye in order to prevent the riots that typically followed, forgoing any deterrent effect in
favor of public safety. In 1838 Tennessee was the first state to pass a statute that allowed
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for discretion in seeking capital punishment. Previously all states had mandatory death
penalty statues for anyone convicted of a capital crime. All similar mandatory statutes
were not removed from state law until 1963.
The pivotal moment for capital punishment in America was the 1972 case Furman
v. Georgia. The Furman Court decided that the arbitrary nature of capital punishment,
which had partly been introduced earlier in the century with the removal of mandatory
death sentences, had made the punishment unconstitutional. While the Furman Court did
not rule that capital punishment was categorically unconstitutional, this decision did
overturn all current state statutes. Many states quickly passed new capital punishment
laws to correspond with the courts decision. To conform to the ruling states introduced
reforms including a bifurcated trial process involving a guilt phase and sentencing phase
and the inclusion of enumerated mitigating and aggravating factors to guide the
sentencing process. The new laws were tested in court and a ruling in Gregg v. Georgia
approved "guided discretion" statutes (Encyclopedia of Criminology. 2005). The court
imposed moratorium lasted 5 years', and the execution of Gary Gilmore in 1977 began
the modern period of capital punishment in the United States (Encyclopedia of
Criminology, 2005).
Recently the Supreme Court has gotten involved again with the shape and
direction of capital punishment in the United States. Three cases all decided between
2002 and 2008 have affected profoundly the way Americans perceive and use capital
punishment.
Atkins v. Virginia, decided in 2002, was a landmark case because the US Supreme
Court decided that those who are found to have some mental disease or defect are not
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punishable by death. Previous to this decision Supreme Court jurisprudence had allowed
for the execution of the mentally handicapped. Writing for the majority in the 1989 case
Penry v. Lynaugh Justice O'Connor wrote;
[There is not] sufficient objective evidence today of a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded capital murderers, since petitioner has cited only one state statute that explicitly
bans that practice and has offered no evidence of the general behavior ofjuries in this regard."
Both public opinion and the Court shifted away from that point of view.
The majority believed that procedures testing competency to stand trial and the insanity
defense would protect the severely mentally retarded. On these beliefs the Penry Court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment did not categorically exclude capital punishment
of the mentally handicapped. The fact that the Atkins Court reversed that conclusion only
13 years later is evidence that the moral standards, at least as they bear on the legal
standards surrounding capital punishment, are constantly under review.
In 2005 the Court in Roper v. Simmons altered capital punishment by preventing
an offender from facing the death penalty if the crime was committed before the offender
was 1 8. 16 years earlier the Court determined that the Constitution did not prohibit the
execution of offenders who were younger than 18 at the time they committed capital
murder. The Roper Court reasoned that a national consensus had developed against the
practice since its ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky.
In 2008 the Supreme Court further limited the applicability of capital punishment
to offenses resulting in a homicide or crimes against the state''. Kennedy v. Louisiana
pronounced a Louisiana law allowing for capital punishment of child rapists who did not
kill their victims unconstitutional. The decision had a sweeping impact on all similar
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Statutes throughout the country. Now, in the majority of cases, the only person who can
have his/her life taken is one who has taken a life.
Capital punishment as an American enterprise has evolved significantly through
both the judiciary and the legislature. Support for capital punishment remains strong in
certain states and within certain populations'". However, the justifications and usage
patterns of the practice have evolved significantly over time. Political decisions,
including judicial review and legislative action, will continue to dictate the use and
evolution of capital punishment. As rates of law enforcement deaths trend upwardsiv, a
way to protect law enforcement officers is necessary. If capital punishment is found to




EXISTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REASEARCH
Prior capital punishment research on deterrence can be split into two separate
types; deterrence of homicide generally and deterrence of specific types of homicides.
Findings are split between a null effect and deterrent effect. Past studies have looked at
both national and state levels for evidence of deterrence. Along with competing
strategies for analysis there are competing view points. Capital punishment and
deterrence are debated by criminologists and economists, each focusing on separate
indicators and reaching different conclusions.
A study by Shepherd (2005), an economist, used aggregated data to compare
state-to-state homicide rates with individual state execution rates. This study tested
whether each state experienced its own deterrent effect relative to the number of
executions it performs. Shepherd concluded that national averages that measure
deterrence are raised by a few states with high execution rates and high ratings of
deterrence. Only six of the eligible states experienced a deterrent effect, but 13
experienced a "brutalization" effect. Brutalization is when statistical tests indicate that
capital punishment has increased the murder rate when compared to jurisdictions without
capital punishment. States with capital punishment statutes do experience a significant
deterrent effect but only after they have reached the threshold number of executions to
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cause deterrence (Shepherd 2005, p. 240). States can also experience a deterrent effect
by returning capital sentences without performing an execution. Most states experienced
neither a deterring nor brutalizing effect. These results suggest that the presence of
capital punishment can be a deterrent even if it was never used. Shepherd also concludes
that executions can deter all types of murder, including crimes of passion. The addition
of the threshold as a consideration for deterrence improved upon past research. By
looking at each state separately Shepherd was able to separate the states that experience
deterrent effects from states that experience brutalization or null effects. However, this
study was aimed at the deterrent effects of capital punishment on all homicides and not
on a particular subset.
Econometric analyses have also been performed recently that use state data to find
an opposite effect from Shepherd (Kovandzic, Vieraitis and Boots, 2009). Taking recent
criticisms of Ehrlrich's 1975 study into account, Kovandzic et al. tested deterrence theory
from 1977 to 2006. This study used more recent and reliable data, estimated further past
the year 2000 and used more efficient methods for estimating standard error. The authors
tested for several possible deterrent effects including: the presence of a death penalty
statute, returning a sentence of capital murder, execution of an offender and frequency of
executions. The authors hypothesized that any one of these factors, or a combination of
them, would produce a deterrent effect. Any or all of the perceived factors would
supposedly enter the mind of an offender and be used in a crime calculation.
Kovandzic et al. also included an extensive list of possible controlling factors.
These factors were sociopolitical in nature, covering everything from the
crack/cocaine epidemic to the number of youths in a state, the passage of
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concealed carry handgun laws and the gallons of beer consumed in any given
state. The authors believed that these factors could control for differences
between DP and non-DP states. While some of the variables were eliminated
after further analyses, it is possible that collinearity existed between controlling
variablesv. Having too many controlling variables, or having them be collinear,
could have affected the results of this study. It could be one of the reasons why
this study did not find the same deterrent effects as earlier, similar studies.
Kovandzic et al. also focused on the criminal calculus, i.e., the concept that
offenders consider the costs and benefits of an anticipated criminal action. They
determined that, for any deterrent effect to exist, the perceived risk factors of execution
would have to be sufficiently high. A reason for this focus could be the economic nature
of the researchers and the analysis. This study cites research to show that, when
offenders perform the criminal calculus, they very infrequently consider long term
results. When they do they are more focused on the potential gains rather than the
punishments (Kovandzic et al., 2009 p. 834). Social science has shown that offenders
engaged in the criminal calculus are prone to discount risk and inflate the value of their
actions based on skills or knowledge they havevl. The ineffectiveness of factors relating
to capital punishment to enter the criminal calculus, and thus the criminal mind, before
committing an offense, has the authors conclude that any deterrent effect would be very
small if at all and that any national deterrent effect is biased by a few states. However,
the research that is cited here does not mention capital murder. All of the criminal
anecdotes discussed are from lower-level offenders (Kovandzic et al., 2009 p. 834). The
Criminal calculus will be different depending on the risk assumed. An identity thief does
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not assume the same risk as someone who kills a police officer, therefore the potential to
gain is different. The nature of the criminal calculus is complex and most likely different
for every individual. Trying to characterize all criminals as thinking one way or another
is impossible.
One drawback to this study is that states that passed capital punishment legislation
before the year 1977 were excluded from parts of the analysis. This affected the test for
deterrence using the existence of a statute as the major indicator. Studies in the past have
found that the presence of the death penalty can be a deterrent even without its use
(Shepherd, 2005). This methodological shortcoming limited the ability to test this
hypothesis fully. The majority of states with capital punishment statutes passed current
laws before 1977. This would cause them to be excluded from this test. Those states
were considered in later analyses in this study, but this problem makes one of the major,
possibly-deterring factors invalid. The presence of capital punishment within a state is
important because it may contribute to deterrence not of homicide generally, but of some
homicides in particular. It is possible that some civilians do not know whether or not
their state practices the death penalty, but most offenders would be aware if the state they
reside in uses of capital punishment. For this reason the presence of the statute could be a
deterring factor and this test should be redone to account for the missing states.
Econometric studies rely on complex statistical methods to generate results.
Kovandzic et al., (2009) criticize earlier studies methodologies for their failure to correct
for serial autocorrelation""1 and heteroscedasticityvl". These statistical problems may have
caused some of the earlier studies to underestimate their standard errors. Underestimated
standard errors will cause factors that would normally be statistically insignificant to
11
appear significant. However, not all econometric studies on deterrence use the same
correction method as Kovandzic et al. Paul Zimmerman (2009) describes some of the
faults of the cluster correction method for autocorrelation. It can cause intervening
measures that would have some effect to appear as though they had no effect. According
to Zimmerman, there are other methods to correct for serial autocorrelation and
heteroscedastic data. No one method is accepted for resolving this problem. Possibly
that the method used by Kovandzic et al. underestimated the significance of potential
deterring factors by using cluster sampling correction methods. Due to differences in
statistical estimation methods econometric analyses of capital punishment at the national
level are inconclusive.
One criticism of capital punishment research is that it relies on aggregated
national or state level data. This type of data is not ideal for tracking small variations in
homicide rates. Small variations caused by a deterrent effect could be more likely in a
state like New Hampshire with both a low homicide and low execution rate. Studies have
been conducted with disaggregated data looking for a localized deterrent effect
(Hjalmarsson, 2009). Hjamlmarsson (2009) used disaggregated data to compare
homicide rates immediately following sentencing and executions in three Texas cities.
When executions are carried out there are 23.6% fewer capital murders in the three days
following an execution (Hjalmarsson, 2009). Despite this study that found no significant
long-term effect when considering all types of homicides, the results may not reflect New
Hampshire or other states. Many social and demographic variables about the cities in this
study do not correspond to conditions in many states. These variables could affect both
the homicide rate and the propensity to be deterred. The regional and cultural differences
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could also affect unseen variables that govern these relationships, like average education
or kinship felt between towns. The three cities considered by Hjamlmarsson (2009) all
have populations significantly higher than the state ofNew Hampshire as well as
different racial and socioeconomic breakdowns from most US states (US Census.gov).
The method of using disaggregated data and tracking media exposure will have different
results in distinct demographic and geographic situations and could produce results
favorable to deterrence theory. Hjamlmarsson's work suggests that the deterrent effect of
the death penalty can be measured with both aggregate and disaggregated data. The same
research could be modified to look over longer periods of time and at specific types of
homicides. Further research is needed with disaggregated data in other locations to find a
deterrent effect.
Economists are conducing the most recent empirical research. Econometric
analyses have dominated the public policy debate on the effectiveness of capital
punishment. As seen above, the results of econometric analyses, while complex and very
specific, are subject to judgments involving methodology. Due to differences in
methodology, economists are divided on the efficacy of capital punishment. However,
criminology as a field, is not. The American Society of Criminology only has two
positions it endorses as matters of policy. Adopted in 1989 the official policy of the ASC
regarding capital punishment reads;
Be it resolved that because social science research has demonstrated the death penalty
to be racist in application and social science research has found no consistent evidence
of crime deterrence through execution, The American Society of Criminology publicly
condemns this form ofpunishment, and urges its members to use their professional
skills in legislatures and courts to seek a speedy abolition of this form ofpunishment.
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Radelet & Lacock (2009) conducted a survey of leading criminologists' current views on
capital punishment. Findings show that a large majority of criminologists do not believe
that capital punishment adds any significant deterrent effect not already produced by life
without the possibility of parole. Only 9.2% of the criminologists surveyed believed "the
death penalty significantly reduces the number of homicides" to be a true statement
(Radelet & Lacock, 2009). Results also indicate that criminologists in 2008 are less
supportive of capital punishment then ever before. Comparing responses from this study
to a similar study from 1996, opposition to capital punishment and disbelief in deterrence
either increased or stayed the same in all questions. When asked if executing people
deters others from committing murder only 2.6% of the criminologists who responded
agreed compared to 89.6% disagreeing (Radelet & Lacock, 2009).
In critiques of econometric or deterrence-based capital punishment research
criminologists have adopted the idea that possible deterrence of specific types of
homicides (Fagan, Zimring and Geller, 2006) A question in general deterrence research
has been the percentage of homicides that are either "death-eligible", or, able to be
deterred. No variation in the percentage of death eligible killings was found even as
execution rates increased. Death eligible killings amount to 25% of total criminal
homicides (Fagan et al, 2006). The largest portion of these is felony murder, where a
homicide occurs in the commission of another felony. This conclusion is questionable
because not all states have such a comprehensive felony murder statute. According to the
study, 43.7 % of capital punishment eligible homicides occur during the commission of a
robbery (Fagan et al., 2006). However, of the homicides considered in this study, only
1.1% were related to the felonious killings of law enforcement officers. This study,
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conducted in Texas, used the Texas statutory framework for capital punishment. Texas is
of special interest to capital punishment and deterrence research for several reasons.
According to Fagan et al. (2006) Texas accounts for more than one-third of executions
since the Supreme Court reversed itself in 1 976. The capital punishment statute in Texas
does not reflect capital punishment statutes in other parts of the country. Felony murder,
the crime most likely to be charged with to create a capital case, is not a death eligible
crime in some states, including New Hampshire. Texas performs more executions than
any other state. Some criminologists have claimed that, by excluding Texas, the deterrent
effects found in econometric studies are removedlx.
Criminological research on the likelihood that capital punishment protects law
enforcement officers through deterrence has been conducted (Sellin, 1959; Bailey 1982;
Bailey & Peterson, 1994). Sellin (1959) found that, the average police homicide rates
between cities with and without capital punishment were nearly identical. This study with
conducted by comparative methods and did not use multivariate regression. Sellin (1959)
calculated rates of police killing by general population while later studies, (Bailey, 1982;
Bailey & Peterson, 1987, Bailey & Peterson, 1994) used an average calculated by deaths
per 1000 police officers.
Multivariate regression analyses were performed by Bailey (1982) and Bailey and
Peterson (1987). These studies analyzed data for years 1961 to 971 and 1973 to 1984
respectfully. Multivariate regression was used to determine and eliminate the influence
of controlling variables. No evidence of deterrence was found in either study.
Bailey & Peterson (1994) improved on prior research by measuring media
exposure of executions while comparing police killing rates to execution rates. The
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inclusion of measures to calculate certainty and quickness and quickness of an execution
along with media exposure tests more of the components of deterrence theory. This study
tested the components of deterrence theory on the specific question of capital punishment
and its ability to potentially protect law enforcement officers. Several of the controlling
variables used in this study are adapted for use in the current study. Results did not show
any indication of deterrence.
Past studies looked for deterrence within the law enforcement community (Sellin,
1959; Bailey, 1982, Bailey & Peterson, 1982 Bailey & Peterson, 1994) or on deterrence
in general (Shepherd, 2005; Kovandzic et al., 2009). Both econometric and
criminological approaches have been used. Criminology and economics are both testing
the deterrence hypothesis in different ways. Previous studies had one or more of several
issues; multiple regression analysis was not used, the question was not of specific
deterrence, not being focused on an offence punishable by death in all 50 states,




EXPLANATION OF CURRENT STUDY
Data and Measures
The dependent variable in both sets of models is the felonious killing ofpolice
officers. Data were gathered from the years 2000 to 2008 from the FBI's Uniform Crime
Report It is hypothesized that the relationship between law enforcement deaths will be
dependent, net of controlling factors, on the presence of a capital punishment statute. To
show deterrence the relationship would appear negative; with the presence of a capital
punishment statute resulting in lower law enforcement deaths. It is also hypothesized that
executions in a previous year will reduce the number of officers killed in the following
year. Felonious law enforcement deaths were selected as a more specific measure of
deterrence because all US jurisdictions with capital punishment have a provision for law
enforcement death. Recent research on deterrence of specific offense types was focused
on crimes that were not universally punishable by death (Fagan et al, 2006). The Current
study aims to produce results which are applicable to all capital punishment jurisdictions.
For the first test the independent variable is the presence of a capital punishment
statute. It is meant to test the hypothesis that the presence of a statute would offer extra
protection to law enforcement officers. In the second test the independent variable is
total executions in a state from the previous year. It is hypothesized that an execution of
17
any kind in a given year will have impact on law enforcement deaths in the following
year.
Additional measures were included to explain variation between the states. These
variables make it possible to compare states with drastically different crime rates and law
enforcement needs. Five controlling variables were included: urbanization, homicide
rate, percent non-white, average high-school graduation and population. Controlling
variables were added in different models to test their explanatory power on the dependent
variable.
Data for this study were gathered from multiple sources. All crime data, homicide
rates and law enforcement homicides by year, were gathered from the FBI's Uniform
Crime Report. The Uniform Crime report is a compilation of officially reported crimes in
the United States. Though the accuracy of official report data has been called into
question in the past (see Elliott & Ageton, 1980; add other citations and also should
describe some examples of why and how official data might be said to sometimes be
inaccurate), the reliability of the homicide data is believed to be higher in comparison
with other official report data (add citations for this). Crimes go unreported or unnoticed,
but homicide rates are believed to be more accurate crime predictors.
Demographic data, including state population and state racial breakdowns, were
gathered from the United States Census website. Data on average high-school graduation
rates were also gathered from the US Census Bureau.
Data on total executions and executions by year was gathered from the Death
Penalty Information Centerx. The sample size for this study was 50. Washington D.C.
and all non-state territories were excluded from this analysisxi. Mediating and controlling
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variables for each state were calculated and included in order for models to more
accurately represent reality. By measuring and mediating the differences in the control
variables the results will reflect the differences related to law enforcement deaths and the
presence of capital punishment.
As a measure for urbanization a list was compiled of the 100 largest cities in the
United States. Each state was ranked based on how many of the cities were within that
state. States ranged from having 0 of the 100 most populous cities; 17 had zero, including
New Hampshire. California had the most with 15 of the largest 100. These data was
gathered from a website which compiles data on US cities™.
A variable was included to control for racial distribution among states. Earlier
studies on this topic (Bailey & Peterson, 1994; Bailey, 1982) included measures for racial
diversity. These studies used percent African-American which has been adapted to
percent non-white to be a better measure of racial diversity. Data were based on the 2000
US Census data. A measure was included to control for average educational attainment.
The percentage of high-school graduates within a state was attained by using census data.
In this study it is hypothesized that educational attainment will equalize some differences
between states and regions of the country.
Method
Multiple non-linear regression analyses were performed in Small STATA 10.
Several estimation methods were used to find the best fit for the data and to ensure the
validity of the results. OLS regression was not chosen due to the use of "count" data;
non-negative sequential integers. Poisson is the modeling method preferred for count
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data but was rejected for the first hypothesis due to a violation of a core assumption.
Poisson regression and negative binomial regression were used at different points during
the analyses. Poisson regression requires that the mean and the variance are equal to be
consistent (Hübe, 2007). Poisson regression is often avoided due to a problem known as
over-dispersion. Over-dispersion will deflate the standard errors. This causes
significance to appear falsely for some controlling variables. This is similar to a Type-I
error, finding a significant relationship when one does not really exist. More than half of
the years analyzed in the first test were found to be over-dispersed. For this reason
negative binomial regression is the method on which the first hypothesis is modeled. The
second hypothesis was not over dispersed and is modeled using poisson regression.
The first hypothesis; the presence of a capital punishment statute will reduce the
number of law enforcement homicides. To determine significance several independent
and controlling variables were used. The dependent variable was set as the number of
police officers feloniously killed in the line of duty with the existence of a capital
punishment statute over a nine-year period as the independent variable. Control variables
include: homicide rate, percent non-white of state population, urbanization and average
high-school graduation. Homicide rate, percent non-white and urbanization were adapted
from Bailey & Peterson (1994) with average high-school graduation added for
exploratory purposes. Five models were run with each year with the fifth model including
all controlling variables being the most accurate. Controlling variables were checked for
covariance and no significant correlation was found.
The second hypothesis; the presence of an execution, for any offense, in a
preceding year will reduce the number of law enforcement officers feloniously killed in
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the line of duty in the following year. Poisson models were used to test the dependent
variable the number of officers feloniously killed. The independent variable was total
executions in the previous year. Controlling variable in this model included state
population and homicide rate.
The homicide rate for each year analyzed is included to determine whether
changes in the number of law enforcement homicides are a function of changing
homicide rates within individual states. States that have higher murder rates are going to
have a higher need for policing. A measure of crime is created using homicide rate and
population. This measure is similar to the studies conducted by Sellin (1959). Population
is used as a predictor of law enforcement assuming larger populations require more law
enforcement officers. Peterson and Bailey (1994) used the number of police officers
rather than overall population in their analyses on deterrence. However, controlling
variables for racial differences and urban differences from that study were adapted to this
one. By combining measures from both Sellin (1959) and Peterson and Bailey (1994) a





Poisson regression was used to test the first hypothesis. Two out of nine years
had significant results in the predicted direction. However, three out of the nine years
were significant in the opposite direction. This modeling method was eventually rejected
due to over-dispersion and the negative binomial regression method was selected. Over-
dispersion was evident based on the mean and variance values displayed during testing.
Values are assumed to be identical for Poisson but were more than three times apart in the
over-dispersed years.
First Hypothesis
A negative relationship between the presence of a capital punishment statute and
the total number of law enforcement killings per year would indicate deterrence. None of
the years considered produced results to indicate that the presence of a capital
punishment statute would reduce the number of officers killed. Several years produced
coefficients with the sign that would be consistent with the hypothesis but they were not
found to be statistically significant.
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The homicide rate was significant in six out of nine years. The relationship was
positive with higher general homicide rates being accompanied by higher rates of law-
enforcement deaths. This relationship was predicted due to similar results appearing in
an earlier study (Bailey & Peterson, 1994).
In six out of the nine years analyzed urbanization was a significant predictor.
States that were higher on the urbanization scale used were statistically more likely to
have higher rates of law enforcement homicide. Percent non-white was not significant in
any of the models. Average high-school graduation was significant in two years, but in a
different direction for each year.
In five out of the nine years results suggested the opposite of deterrence, with the
presence of a capital punishment statute resulting in the likelihood of more law
enforcement deaths. Due to limitations in these analyses no causal direction can be
determined. In four of those years the significant positive relationship was eliminated
with the inclusion of controlling variables. However, one of the nine years had a
significant relationship in the positive direction that was not mitigated by the inclusion of
controlling variables.
Overall puesdo-R2 values™1 varied from .08 to .23 for these tests. This could
mean that some of the models derived were not accurately tracking the differences
between the independent and dependent variables.
Second Hypothesis
In testing whether an execution during a given year reduces the likelihood of law
enforcement deaths in the following year the Poisson model was reinstituted. These data
did not suffer from over-dispersion like the first hypothesis. In three out of the nine years
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tested the executions were significant, but not in the predicted direction. Results indicate
that an execution will not reduce the amount of law enforcement deaths in the following
year and that states that have had an execution are statistically more likely to have law
enforcement officers killed than states that do not. Population was a significant predictor
in all models. States with higher populations were statistically more likely to have law
enforcement officers killed.
Homicide rate was significant in all but one of the years. The finding that higher
general homicide rate results in more officers being killed is not surprising. It also
supports results from the first hypothesis. Even when a control for population was
introduced, higher homicide rates were the best predictors of law enforcement officers
being killed. R2 values ranged from .08 to .32.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
No evidence for deterrence was found from either test and the results
require the rejection of both hypotheses. Based on these results capital
punishment does not offer additional protection to law enforcement officers from
lethal assault. However, the analyses performed here are methodologically
limited. Improvements on the methodology could strengthen the conclusions and
drive future research.
These results are questionable due to low pseudo-R values. In some years
the values indicate that the controlling variables had little to no impact on law
enforcement homicides. It is possible that the pseudo-R2 values for non-linear
regression are lower than for OLS regression. It is also possible that some
intervening or mediating variables that affect law enforcement deaths were left
out of these analyses. These analyses only covered a nine-year period between
2000 and 2008. A longer time series could more accurate model what is going on.
The control variables in the current study could be improved for future research.
This could be done with both the inclusion of new variables and the refinement of
existing variables. Factors might include, unemployment, percent of population
within 18-25, and average income could control for differences between states
and regions to give a clearer picture of capital punishment. The variable for
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urbanization in this study, while an effective predictor, could be improved.
Counting the number of cities with a population of 1 00,000 or cities with over a
certain amount of police officers has the potential to be a better measure of
urbanization for these tests.
Washington D.C. and all Federal capital offenses were excluded from
these analyses. Initially, Washington D.C. was included but all significant
relationships were erased with the inclusion of the additional factor. Washington
D.C. is unique in that it has a high population with a high crime rate but does not
have capital punishment. Future research could explore the potential impact of
Washington D. C. in studies that claimed to find a national deterrent effect.
A future study on specific offense deterrence and law enforcement could better
incorporate all of the attributes of deterrence, similar to Peterson & Bailey (1994)
or Hjalmarsson (2009). Deterrence is founded on; celerity, severity, certainty and
public exposure. These studies included measures of media exposure of
executions. It is possible that executions that are more public will have greater
deterrent effect than executions done in private. Throughout history executions
were performed in public to increase the deterrent effect. This practice was
stopped because of the immediate danger to public safety that was caused.
However, in the modern world of television, newspaper and internet news
an execution could be very public without as much immediate danger to public
safety. Separating what is "public" and what is "public knowledge" becomes
important. In the past, with limited mass communication and media, executions
were done in public places for maximum effectiveness. Their public location was
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at the same time their publicity. In the modern era publicity and public locale are
not as congruent. Executions could be very public without gathering a large
group into a potential dangerous situation. Increasing the amount of media
coverage or allowing for spectators remotely are ways that the publicity of
executions could be raised. These changes would affect the amount of deterrence
any individual execution carries. A future study could test executions for
differences in media exposure and determine how much deterrence is affected by
these differences.
The role of deterrence research in legislative or judicial action is unclear.
States are reviewing the implementation of capital punishment and deterrence is a
possible justification. Research showing capital punishment improves police
safety, or public safety, would be a powerful tool in this debate. The US Supreme
Court is clear in its support for capital punishment. The Court has recently been
more willing to quantify and restrict certain specific attributes of capital
punishment. The evolving moral standards require that capital punishment is
monitored and that its application is not detrimental to society. The Court has
shown its willingness to restrict the practice of capital punishment to conform to
moral standards. Research that demonstrates where, when and how capital
punishment could be more effective, or effective at all, would be influential to this
policy making process. The more the issue of capital punishment becomes
debated by legislatures the more important the position of the Supreme Court.
The question on deterrence is frequently reduced to one of marginal
deterrence; does it deter better than life without the possibility of parole? Studies
27
on the possibility of deterring certain groups of people, certain localities
(Hjalmarsson, 2009) or certain crimes (Bailey and Peterson, 1994; Fagan, 2006)
fail to answer that question. Future research on deterrence should be as specific
as possible within these groups in search of a deterrent effect.
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1 The actual moratorium on executions was from 1976 to 1977. However, this was not required by the
Supreme Court. States limited their use of capital punishment due to the highlighted problems in the
Furman and Gregg cases.
Crimes against the state that do not necessarily have homicides associated with them are treason and
espionage.
111 A Gallup Poll conducted in October, 2009 found that 65% of those polled were in favor of capital
punishment for someone convicted of murder and that 31% were against.
lv Law Enforcement Deaths Rise Nationwide, The Washington Examiner, 8/24/2010
v Multicollinearity is a problem is regression modeling because it can compromise the reliability of
predictors in a given model. When two predictor variables are highly correlated, so that they may be
predicting almost the same thing, including both in the analyses can compromise the validity of the results
on those predictors. This affects Kovandzic et al. (2009) because of the number of included predictors
increases the chances for multicollinearity.
V1 Parisi, Francesco and Smith, Vernon L., The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior: An Introduction.
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-16; F. Parisi & V. Smith, THE LAW &
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, Stanford University Press, 2005
™ Auto Correlation is a measure of the connected relationship between values during a time series set of
data. When many variables over time have the same value it can be said to be auto-correlated.
™' Heteroscedasticity is when random variables have different variances. This can violate an assumption
required for some statistical tests. The result can be biased standard errors which make variables appear
significant when they are not (Hübe, 2007).
lx A study by Mocan & Gittings (2003) found that executions deter around five homicides and that
commutation of executions increase the homicide total by the same amount. A critique of this study by
Richard Berk found that excluding Texas caused any deterrent effect to disappear. Mocan & Gittings are
economists and Berk is a criminologist. The debate on this topic is split between the two disciplines.
x The Death penalty Information Center is the foremost abolitionist organization in the United States. They
work towards abolishing capital punishment in every state. However, they also compile lots of accurate
data and that was extremely helpful in the creation of a dataset for this paper.
"' The same analyses were preformed with Washington D.C. included. Washington D.C. was an anomaly
that caused other relationships to be obscured. For this reason the study was focused on just the 50 states.
™ www.City-Data.com has been recognized by CNN and gets their information from public records. It is
owned and operated by Advameg.
X1" Pseudo R2 values are indicators of goodness-of-fit. Values range between zero and one. The value
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